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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960606-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Computer 
Crimes, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-703 (Supp. 1996) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum A), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), as applied 
in this matter, violates due process under the state and federal 
constitutions and the equal protection provision of the federal 
constitution. The conduct proscribed by the statute requires 
proof of the same conduct proscribed by Utah's forgery, and 
insurance and communications fraud statutes. Yet § 76-6-703 
provides a harsher penalty to those found guilty. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue presented on appeal is a 
question of law, with respect to which this Court will not defer 
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in any degree to the trial court but will review the trial 
court's determination for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Motion to Strike Computer Crimes Statute and 
supporting memorandum are preserved in the Record on Appeal 
("R.") at 20-25. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1996). 
Article I, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution. 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution. 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In November 1995, the State of Utah charged Appellant Simone 
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Lucia Kent ("Kent") with two counts of Computer Crimes, second 
degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), and 
served her with an arrest warrant. (R. 1-4; 7-9.) Kent request-
ed the entry of an order striking the Computer Crimes statute as 
unconstitutional. (R. 21-25.) The trial court denied the request. 
(R. 75-76.) 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a plea agreement (R. 
46-54) wherein Kent pled guilty to one count of the Computer 
Crimes offense and the state dismissed the second count. (R. 76-
77.) The parties specifically conditioned the plea upon Kent's 
right to appeal the statutory and constitutional challenges to 
the Computer Crimes statute, pursuant to Rule 11(i), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 93 5 (Utah App. 
1988). (R. 50; 76- 83.) 
After entry of the plea, the trial court sentenced Kent to 
serve one to fifteen years imprisonment and to pay restitution. 
(R. 59.) The trial court stayed the prison sentence and placed 
Kent on probation. (Id.) Kent's appeal of the trial court's 
ruling on the constitutionality of Section 76-6-703 is from the 
final judgement in this matter. (R. 60; 65-66.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kent was charged by Information with two counts of Computer 
Crimes, second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 
(Supp. 1996). (R. 1-4.) The Information stated in part: 
A complaint has been made . . . that you committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT 1: 
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COMPUTER CRIMES, a Second Degree Felony, at Salt Lake City, 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, on or about March 2, 1995 through 
March 9, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
703, Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, a party to the offense, did intentionally 
use a computer, computer network, computer property, or 
computer system, program, or software to devise or execute 
any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money, 
property, services, or other things of value, to-wit: a 
check in the amount of $3,500. from First Health, by false 
pretenses, promises, or representations. 
(R. 1-3.) The second count contained similar language, but 
reflected receipt of a check in the amount of $7,500. The 
probable cause statement stated the following: 
On March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent W. Stephen Whittle 
received information from Leslie Warner of the First Health 
security department, in Salt Lake City, Utah, that possible 
computerized fraud had occurred in their insurance claim 
system, and that two unauthorized checks for $3,500 and 
$7,500 had been sent from their office to a post office box 
located in West Valley City, UT. in the name of Cathleen 
Gullett. The defendant was identified as the operator of 
the terminal from which the unauthorized checks had been 
issued. 
(R. 2-3.) Kent challenged Section 76-6-703 as unconstitutional 
since it requires proof of the same elements set forth in other 
Utah criminal statutes, yet provides a harsher penalty. (R. 21-
25.) The trial court rejected Kent's challenge, and the state 
agreed to the entry of a plea pursuant to Sery, 758 P.2d at 935, 
in order that Kent could seek review on appeal of the trial 
court's ruling. (R. 46-54; 76-83.) During the plea colloquy, 
the prosecutor stated the following: 
[Trial court to the prosecutor]: And you don't have an 
objection to the Sery plea and reserving the right to appeal 
this ruling on the Constitutionality [of the statute]? 
[Prosecutor]: To appeal the Constitutionality, I'm not going 
to object[.] 
• * * 
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Because of the seriousness of the Constitutionality 
challenge, I have given Counsel [for Kent] a lot of leeway 
on this and I will not object to that portion of this 
agreement as well. 
(R. 77-78.) Kent entered a guilty plea to Count 1 of the 
Information and the state dismissed the second count. (R. 46-54; 
76-83.) Thereafter the trial court sentenced Kent to prison, 
then stayed the sentence and imposed three years probation and 
restitution. (R. 59.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Computer Crimes statute set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-703 (Supp. 1996) is violative of the due process provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions and the equal protection 
provision of the federal constitution in that it proscribes 
conduct addressed in other statutes, to wit: the Insurance Fraud 
statute, the Forgery statute, and the Communications Fraud 
statute. The Computer Crimes statute provides a harsher penalty 
than is provided in the other statutes, thereby subjecting 
defendants to differing penalties. Equal protection of the laws 
requires that the law affects alike all persons similarly 
situated. The penalty proscribed for like offenses must be 
equal. Because the Computer Crimes statute provides a harsher 
penalty, it is violative of the equal protection provision of the 
federal constitution. In addition, because the Computer Crimes 
statute requires proof of the same elements set forth in other 
statutes, it violates the due process provisions of the state and 
federal constitutions --it creates doubt or uncertainty as to 
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which statute is applicable and gives the prosecutor impermis-
sible discretion to choose a defendant's penalty based upon which 
statute the prosecutor chooses to charge under. Kent requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the basis 
that the Computer Crimes statute is unconstitutional as applied 
in this case, and remand this matter to have Kent's case proceed 
under one of the statutes providing a less severe punishment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE IS DUPLICATIVE OF OTHER 
STATUTES AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME YET PUNISHES 
MORE HARSHLY, COMPELLING THE DETERMINATION THAT KENT IS 
ENTITLED TO BE CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE CARRYING THE 
LESS SEVERE PUNISHMENT, 
A. THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE EVEN-HANDED 
PUNISHMENT UNDER THE LAW. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution protects 
citizens of the state against arbitrary and capricious laws. It 
provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." The federal counterpart 
is the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV. Under a due process analysis, 
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those 
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
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357 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 
819 (Utah 1991) . The United States Supreme Court has explained 
that the vagueness doctrine is critical with respect to a 
legislative failure to provide sufficient guidelines concerning 
the application of a penal statute. 
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual 
freedoms within a frame work of ordered liberty. 
Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined 
for substantive authority and content as well as for 
definiteness or certainty of expression. 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohi-
bited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. Although the doctrine 
focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary 
enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more 
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not 
actual notice, but the other principal element of the 
doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature estab-
lish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." 
Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal 
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standard-
less sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections." 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (citations omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also denounced vagueness in penal statutes: 
The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime 
should be sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary 
intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it.[] A fair and 
logical concomitant of that rule is that such a penal 
statute should be similarly clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation. 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). In that regard, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized the rule "that where there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable 
to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the 
lesser." Id. 
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Likewise, "where there are two statutes which proscribe the 
same conduct but impose different penalties, the violator is en-
titled to the lesser." State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)). 
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that there 
are significant differences between offenses and so that the 
exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties 
depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor 
chooses to charge. To allow that would be to allow a form 
of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The 
legislature may make automobile homicide which is committed 
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot 
make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the 
choice to the prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony 
or a misdemeanor. 
Because a "reckless" defendant could, for the same 
behavior, be charged under either statute, the statutes give 
a prosecutor impermissible discretion to choose a 
defendant's penalty based upon which statute the prosecutor 
chooses to charge under. 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985). 
The early Utah Supreme Court also found disfavor in the 
notion of leaving the choice to the prosecutor when more than one 
criminal statute may apply, as set forth in this example: 
For example, A., who has disposed of intoxicating liquor to 
an Indian, might be charged with and convicted of a felony, 
and sentenced to a term in the state prison, while B., who 
might be equally guilty, but favored by some county attorney 
as the initial prosecutor, would be charged and convicted of 
a misdemeanor only, and thus be fined or at most sent to the 
county jail for 3 0 days. 
State v. Carman, 140 P. 670, 671 (Utah 1914) . 
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause of the federal 
constitution provides: "persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984); McLaughlin v. Florida, 
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379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964); U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1; Utah Const. 
art. I, § 2 ("all free governments are founded on their authority 
for their equal protection"). 
To that end, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
[A] prosecutor should not have the freedom to choose between 
charging either a felony or a misdemeanor when the two 
crimes have exactly the same substantive elements. We agree 
that that situation would deny defendant and others in his 
class equal protection of the laws, "if the same identical 
facts may be used in prosecutions under two completely inte-
grated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the other a felony." 
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 261 (quoting State v. Twitchell, 333 P.2d 
1075, 1077 (Utah 1959)). It is well established that a statute 
proscribing the same conduct as another statute, but providing a 
harsher penalty, violates due process and equal protection under 
the state and federal constitutions. In comparing the Computer 
Crimes statute to the Insurance and Communications Fraud statutes 
and the Forgery statute, the penalty imposed by the Computer 
Crimes statute is unfair and uneven. The trial court erred in 
failing to proceed under one of the statutes with the less severe 
penalty, as further discussed in Section D., below. 
B. THE MENTAL STATE THAT MUST BE PROVED TO CONVICT A 
DEFENDANT OF AN OFFENSE ESTABLISHES THE "GRADE" OF THE 
OFFENSE FOR PUNISHMENT PURPOSES. 
In construing the application of criminal laws, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that the differences in the "grade" 
of offenses (i.e. from class C to A misdemeanors, and third to 
first degree felonies) are manifested by the increasingly 
culpable mental states of the offenses. "If the State can prove 
that a defendant acted with the more culpable mental state, the 
defendant can be convicted of the higher offense." Bryan, 709 
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P.2d at 262. Associating the grade of an offense with a certain 
mental culpability assures rational, even-handed application of 
the criminal laws, satisfying due process and equal protection 
concerns. That association is compelling basis for reversing the 
trial court's ruling and requiring it to proceed with this matter 
under one of the more lenient statutes as set forth in Section 
D., below. 
C. ACCORDING TO UTAH LAW, A SPECIFIC STATUTE APPLIES OVER A 
MORE GENERAL STATUTE. 
In cases where the alleged conduct may be charged under 
either a specific statute or a general statute, the state may 
"charge a violation of the statute that 'applies more 
specifically to [defendant's] offense.'" State v. Hales, 652 
P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1982) (quoting Rammell, 560 P.2d at 1110). 
In Hales, a custodian of public records was charged under § 76-8-
412, as an "officer having the custody of any record," with will-
fully mutilating such records. The offense was a third degree 
felony. Defendant contended she should have been charged under 
the general "tampering with records" provision, which was a class 
B misdemeanor offense that applied to "any person." The Utah 
Supreme Court found defendant's argument unpersuasive: 
Even assuming arguendo that the acts prohibited by these two 
sections are identical, however, section 76-8-412 applies to 
an "officer having the custody of any record," whereas 
section 76-6-504 applies to "[a]ny person." The distinction 
is manifestly rational. Public officials have greater 
access to public records and, by virtue of the public trust 
reposed in them, a higher responsibility to safeguard the 
interests and property of the public than do other members 
of the community. For a public official to destroy public 
records is a betrayal of the public trust and therefore more 
serious than the same act committed by a private individual. 
Similarly, any person with formal custody of public records, 
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even if not a public officer, has received a limited public 
trust on a temporary basis. But because public officers and 
other custodians are themselves charged with protecting the 
records entrusted to them, the State has little means other 
than severe criminal deterrents to guard against their 
destructive acts. 
Id. at 1293; see also. State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Utah 
1986) (defendants charged with more specific crime of 
fraudulently "signing" financial transaction card); State v. 
Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing difference 
between general theft statute and specific theft of livestock 
statute); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1979) 
(where conflict between statute dealing with controlled sub-
stances and forgery statute existed, former specific statute 
applied to offense of obtaining controlled substances in pre-
scription form, specifically where controlled substance act 
required application of such a provision in the face of a con-
flict) ; State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862, 862-63 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Duran, 772 
P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989) (statutes applied to different 
classes of persons, making specific statute applicable). 
As set forth below, the conduct alleged in the Information 
against Kent is punishable under the specific provisions of at 
least three other statutes. The Computer Crimes statute carries a 
harsher punishment. Thus, the trial court should have resolved 
the conflict in Kent's favor by proceeding under the statute with 
the less severe penalty. 
D. WHERE MORE THAN ONE STATUTE PROSCRIBES THE SPECIFIC 
CONDUCT AT ISSUE IN THIS MATTER, KENT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE 
THE CASE PROCEED UNDER THE STATUTE THAT PROVIDES THE LESS 
SEVERE PUNISHMENT. 
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Shondel, Loveless, Bryan, Hales, Clark, and Helmuth, reflect 
the following: (1) Where two or more statutes define a criminal 
offense based on essentially the same conduct, the defendant is 
entitled to have his or her case proceed under the statute that 
carries the less severe penalty (see also State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 
168, 168-69 (Utah 1969) (according to the court in Shondel, 
legislation "making an act subject to two legislative fiats one 
of which would penalize an accused as a misdemeanant, the other 
as a felon, gave the accused the benefit of being accountable 
only for the lesser of the two penalties")); (2) statutes 
specifying greater culpable mental states carry greater 
punishments (Bryan, 709 P.2d at 262); and (3) specific statutes 
apply over general statutes (Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335). 
In this matter, Kent was charged with violations of the 
Computer Crimes statute set forth at § 76-6-703(3): 
A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use 
any computer, computer network, computer property, or 
computer system, program, or software to devise or execute 
any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money, 
property, services, or other things of value by false 
pretenses, promises, or representations, is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree. 
The mental culpability that must be proved under the offense is 
undefined, except where a person "knowingly allows another person 
to use" a computer system. Another element of the offense is the 
element of "defraud[ing]." The terms "fraud" and "defraud" have 
been defined as follows: "Fraud is defined as an instance or an 
12 
act of trickery or deceit; an act of deluding; an intentional 
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing another in reliance 
upon it to part with some valuable thing." State v. Kitchen, 564 
P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977). 
1. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute to the Forgery 
Statute. 
The Forgery statute provides the following: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a 
fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
* * * 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original exists. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996). Like the Computer Crimes 
statute, the Forgery statute requires proof of "defraud[ing]" in 
the making, completion, transfer or utterance, etc., of a false 
"writing." The Forgery statute defines "writing" as including 
"electronic storage or transmission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501 (2) (Supp. 1996) . 
The mental culpability that must be established to prove 
fraud in the Forgery statute is "purpose." It is greater than, 
or at least equal to, that which is required under the Computer 
Crimes statute. Thus, under Bryan, the Computer Crimes statute 
should carry the same less severe punishment as that set forth in 
the Forgery statute. See section B., supra. Yet the Computer 
Crimes statute carries a harsher punishment. The fairer penalty 
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in this matter is the third degree penalty as set forth in the 
Forgery statute as opposed to the harsher Computer Crimes statute 
penalty. 
In addition, the Forgery statute is more specifically 
tailored to fit the facts articulated in the Information in this 
matter, where the Information sets forth that fraud was committed 
"possibl[y]" by electronic transmission, and as a result of that 
act, unauthorized checks were sent to "Cathleen Gullett," an 
existent or nonexistent person, and that Kent had been 
"identified as the operator of the terminal from which the 
unauthorized checks had been issued." (R. 2-3 (emphasis added).) 
Inasmuch as the Forgery statute is specifically tailored to 
the facts of this matter as set forth in the Information (R. 1-4) 
and contains the less severe penalty (notwithstanding the proof 
under the Forgery statute of an equal, if not greater, mens rea) , 
and inasmuch as the separate laws create a conflict that leave 
the prosecutor with the discretion to charge either offense, the 
trial court erred in refusing to (1) resolve the conflict in 
Kent's favor and (2) apply the statute with the less severe 
penalty. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 264; Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577; 
Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Clark, 632 
P.2d at 844; Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335. 
2. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute and the Insurance 
Fraud Statute. 
The Insurance Fraud statute at Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521, 
provides that if a person "with intent to defraud," presents "or 
causes to be presented" any "representation" in support of an 
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insurance claim "for payment" or other benefit pursuant to a 
policy, certificate or contract, "knowing that the statement or 
representation contains false or fraudulent information 
concerning any fact or thing material to the claim," the conduct 
is punishable "in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for 
communication fraud for property of like value." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-521(1)(b), (2)(b) (1995). Section 76-10-1801 would make 
the offense in this action a third degree felony where "the value 
of the property, money, or thing obtained" as set forth in Count 
1 exceeded $1,000 but was less than $5,000. 
The elements of Insurance Fraud include an "intent" element. 
The mental culpability is at least equal to, if not greater than, 
that set forth in the Computer Crimes statute, which leaves the 
mental culpability undefined except where the statute makes it 
criminal to "knowingly allow another to use" a computer system. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (Supp. 1996). Under Bryan, since the 
difference in grade between the Insurance Fraud statute ("intent 
to defraud") and the Computer Crimes statute ("knowingly" use) is 
of decreasing, or at least equal, mental culpability, see Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103 and -104 (1995), both statutes should carry 
the same less severe punishment. See section B., supra. Yet the 
Computer Crimes statute carries a harsher punishment. The fairer 
penalty in this matter is the third degree penalty as set forth 
in the Insurance Fraud statute and § 76-10-1801, as opposed to 
the harsher Computer Crimes statute penalty. 
Notwithstanding the difference in punishment, the Insurance 
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Fraud statute, like the Computer Crimes statute, requires proof 
of fraud in connection with obtaining a payment. The Insurance 
Fraud statute is more specifically tailored to the facts alleged 
in the Information in this case, where the statute applies to 
fraud occurring in connection with an insurance claim and to 
payments made as a result of the alleged fraud. In this matter, 
the trial court stated the offense at issue consisted of 
l!hav[ing] the insurance company send checks that were not 
warranted, to a P.O. Box, in fact." (R. 76.) Likewise, the 
Information stated, "[o]n March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent . . . 
received information from . . . First Health security department 
. . . that possible computerized fraud had occurred in their 
insurance claim system, and that two unauthorized checks . . . 
had been sent from their office. . . ." (R. 2-3.) 
Inasmuch as the Insurance Fraud statute goes specifically to 
the facts at issue in this matter as set forth in the Information 
(R. 1-4) and contains the less severe penalty (notwithstanding 
the proof under the Insurance Fraud statute of the greater 
"intent" mens rea), and inasmuch as the Insurance Fraud statute 
and the Computer Crimes statute create a conflict in that the 
laws leave the prosecutor with the discretion to charge either 
offense, the trial court erred in refusing to (1) resolve the 
conflict in favor of Kent and (2) apply the statute with the less 
severe penalty. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 264; Loveless, 581 P.2d at 
577; Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Clark, 
632 P.2d at 844; Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335. 
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3. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute to the 
Communications Fraud Statute. 
Finally, the Communications Fraud statute provides that a 
person who engages in purposeful, fraudulent conduct when the 
value of the property is between $1,000 and $5,000 may be 
punishable for a third degree felony: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice is guilty of . . . a third degree felony when the 
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to 
be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1) (a) and (c) (Supp. 1996). That 
provision requires proof of "purpose." Again, the mental 
culpability is greater than, or at least equal to, that which 
must be proved under the Computer Crimes statute. In addition, 
as with the other statutes, the Communications Fraud statute 
requires proof of fraud and the same other elements set forth in 
the Computer Crimes statute. The trial court should have required 
application of the Communications Fraud statute -- it provides 
the less severe penalty. 
The Computer Crimes statute requires proof of the elements 
set forth in three other Utah statutes that are more specifically 
tailored to the facts alleged in the Information in this matter. 
The three separate statutes require the state to prove a mens rea 
equal to or greater than that required in the Computer Crimes 
statute, and they carry lesser penalties. The trial court erred 
in failing to declare the Computer Crimes statute 
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unconstitutional in the context of this case and in failing to 
enter an order that the state must proceed under one of the other 
criminal provisions carrying the less severe penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
Kent hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the trial court. 
SUBMITTED this 32/JL day of CZU^^^y. , 1996. 
INDA M. JONES// LINDA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JUDITH A. JENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. 
Honorable. 
Clerk Jy. ! 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date &? rs^ffr 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; dtfplea of guilty; 
D plea q j j i o contest; of the offense of ( ^ ^ i i C T l (}MjfV\qj L _ , a felony 
of the r y ~ dearee, D a class misdemeanor, being now presept in court and ready for sentence and 
represented hy^N - v\Q JVYflGVy - and the State being represented hy(y. ffllAfJM &J\JK now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of. years and which may be for life; 
Dynot to exceed five years; 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
; * 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ^y^Tr- #"V \ t — " A ^ A n /) 
^ and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ QEQ to U^J<X^\0L\/J NJL<^ 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
\ g Defendant is granted a stay of the above (£lPrison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
' custody of this Court and.urKler the^uggrvision of thr _Chirf Agont I Itnh Rtntn nnpnilmrnt nf ftrlult 
<£a»le for the period of ^ ( 0 V V \ V A \ ^ , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D fo r^ faas jy jo^e Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where rf^r^aiit's^rbeqonfined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. f£ >'<>y \-~~> -\% •*< „ * x 
D Commitment shall issue ^ 
- V ^ - d a y DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
dxH 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page of 
i« , i /Pn«rtn/APAPl fPink—Defenae} fGoldenrod—State) <r^? 
ADDENDUM B 
76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punish-
ment as for theft. 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent 
to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains 
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an appli-
cation for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or 
contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or 
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other 
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in 
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for 
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the state-
ment or representation contains false or fraudulent information concern-
ing any fact or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a fraudulent 
insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to 
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsections (l)(b) through (l)(d), is punishable as in 
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud for 
property of like value. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud 
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (1Kb) 
through (l)(d) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or 
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act 
or acts described in Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d). 
76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties. 
(1) A person who gains or attempts to gain access to and without authori-
zation intentionally, and to the damage of another, alters, damages, destroys, 
discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer property, 
computer system, program, or software is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) A person who intentionally and without authorization uses a computer, 
computer network, computer property, or computer system to gain or attempt 
to gain access to any other computer, computer network, computer property, or 
computer system, program, or software, to the damage of another, and alters, 
damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any of these, is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
(3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any 
computer, computer network, computer property, or computer system, pro-
gram, or software to devise or execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to 
obtain money, property, services, or other things of value by false pretenses, 
promises, or representations, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
(4) A person who intentionally and without authorization interferes with or 
interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(5) A person who intentionally and without authorization damages or 
destroys, in whole or in part, any computer, computer network, computer 
property, or computer system is guilty of a class A misdemeanor unless the 
amount of damage is or exceeds $1,000, in which case the person is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree. 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penal-
ties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) Tb communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they 
have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may 
require. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
